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BC	CORONER	RELEASES	LATEST	ILLICIT	DRUG	OVERDOSE	STATS
In a recently released report, the Office of BC’s Chief Coroner announced that there were 128 illicit drug 
overdose deaths in November 2016  alone. This is the highest number of recorded overdose deaths in a single 
month in BC bringing  the yearly total of overdose deaths to 755, more than a 70% increase over the same 
period in 2015. Moreover, the report attributes fentanyl laced drugs as accounting  for the increase in overdose 
deaths. According  to preliminary data for January to October 
2016, the proportion of overdose deaths for which fentanyl was 
detected - alone or in combination with other drugs - increased 
to about 60%, up from 30% in 2015.
People aged 30-39 have been the hardest hit so far in 2016  with 
214 illicit drug  overdose deaths followed by 40-49 year-olds at 
177 deaths and 19-29 year-olds at 172 deaths. Vancouver had 
the most deaths at 164 followed by Surrey (92), Victoria (60), 
Kelowna (40), and Abbotsford and Kamloops each with 32. 
The data also indicates that most illicit drug  overdoses occur 
inside (87%) while 11% occurred outside including  vehicles, 
streets, sidewalks, parking  lots, parks, wooded areas and 
campgrounds. For the remaining  7 deaths, the place of death 
was unknown. 
Many police departments are trying  to message to various 
segments of  the population in different ways. Above is  one 
such messaging  example provided by the Abbotsford Police 
Department. (Source Abbotsford Police)
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Unless otherwise noted all articles are authored by 
Mike  Novakowski, MA, LLM. The articles contained 
herein are provided for information purposes only 
and are not to be construed as legal or other 
professional advice. The opinions expressed herein 
are not necessarily  the opinions of the Justice 
Institute of British Columbia. “In Service: 10-8” 
welcomes your comments or contributions to this 
newsletter.   
Upcoming Courses
Advanced	Police	Training
Advanced training provides opportunities for skill 
development and career enhancement for police 
officers. Training  is offered in the areas of 
investigation, patrol operations and leadership for 
in-service municipal and RCMP police officers.
JIBC	Police	Academy
See Course List here.
Graduate Certificates
Intelligence Analysis
or 
Tactical Criminal Analysis
www.jibc.ca
NEW JIBC Graduate 
Certificate in Public 
Safety Leadership
see 
pages  
31-32
Westin	Bayshore,	Vancouver,	BC
See page 17
Leadership Through Crisis
Note-able Quote
“Opportunity is missed by most people 
because it is dressed in overalls and looks 
like work.” - Thomas A. Edison
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WHAT’S	NEW	FOR	POLICE	IN	
THE	LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
Active shooter:  preparing  for and responding to a 
growing threat.
Kevin T. Doss,  C. David Shepherd.
Oxford, UK: Elsevier/Butterworth-Heinemann 2015.
HF 5549.5 E43 D67 2015
Anabolic steroid abuse in public safety 
personnel: a forensic manual.
Brent E. Turvey, Stan Crowder.
Amsterdam, NL: Elsevier Academic Press, 2015.
HV 4999 T87 2015
The awakened family: a revolution in parenting.
Shefali Tsabary, Ph. D.
New York, NY: Viking, 2016.
HQ 755.8 T816 2016
The brain's way of healing: remarkable 
discoveries and recoveries from the frontiers of 
neuroplasticity.
Norman Doidge, M.D.
New York, NY: Penguin Books, an imprint of Penguin 
Random House LLC, 2016.
QP 363.3 D66 2015
Culture and online learning: global  perspectives 
and research.
Edited by Insung  Jung  and Charlotte  Gunawardena. 
Sterling, VA: Stylus, 2014.
LC 5803 C65 C85 2014
Doing  respectful research:  power, privilege and 
passion.
Susan A. Tilley.
Black Point, NS: Fernwood Publishing, 2016.
GN 345 T54 2016
Enterprise risk management: a common 
framework for the entire organization.
Philip E.J. Green, editor.
Amsterdam, NL: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2016.
HD 61 E58 2016
A field guide to lies: critical thinking  in the 
information age.
Daniel J. Levitin.
Toronto, ON: Allen Lane, 2016.
HA 29 L49 2016
In this together: fifteen  stories of truth & 
reconciliation.
edited by Danielle Metcalfe-Chenail.
Victoria, BC: Brindle & Glass, 2016.
E 78 C2 I595 2016
The language of emotions:  what your feelings are 
trying to tell you.
Karla McLaren.
Boulder, CO: Sounds True, 2010.
BF 531 M357 2010
More harm than good: drug policy in Canada. 
Susan Boyd, Connie I. Carter & Donald MacPherson.
Halifax, NS: Fernwood Publishing, 2016.
Pressed for time: the acceleration of life in  digital 
capitalism.
Judy Wajcman.
Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2015.
HM 656 W35 2015 
Storytelling  with data: a data visualization guide 
for business professionals
Cole Nussbaumer Knaflic.
Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2015.
QA 76.9 I52 K64 2015
The thoughtful leader:  a model of integrative 
leadership.
Jim Fisher.
Toronto, ON; Buffalo, NY; London, UK: University of 
Toronto Press, 2016.
BF 637 L4 F55 2016
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IACP OFFERS APOLOGY FOR 
HISTORICAL INJUSTICES
The president of the International Association of Chiefs 
of Police, Terrence M. Cunningham, made the 
following statement on October 17, 2016 during the 
2016 IACP Annual Conference and Exposition in San 
Diego, California: 
“I would like to take a moment to address a 
significant and fundamental issue 
confronting our profession,  particularly 
within the United States. Clearly, this is a 
challenging time for policing. Events over 
the past several years have caused many to 
question the actions of our officers and 
has tragically undermined the trust that 
the public must and should have in their 
police departments. At times such as this, 
it is our role as leaders to assess the 
situation and take the steps necessary to 
move forward.
This morning, I would like to address one 
issue that I believe will help both our 
profession and our communities. The 
history of the law enforcement 
profession is replete with examples of 
bravery, self-sacrifice, and service to 
the community. At its core, policing is a 
noble profession made up of women and 
men who have sworn to place themselves between 
the innocent and those who seek to do them harm.
Over the years, thousands of police officers have 
laid down their lives for their fellow citizens 
while hundreds of thousands more have been 
injured while protecting their communities. The 
nation owes all of those officers, as well as those 
who are still on patrol today, an enormous debt of 
gratitude.
At the same time, it is also clear that the history 
of policing has also had darker periods.
There have been times when law enforcement 
officers, because of the laws enacted by federal, 
state, and local governments, have been the face 
of oppression for far too many of our fellow 
citizens. In the past, the laws adopted by our 
society have required police officers to perform 
many unpalatable tasks, such as ensuring legalized 
discrimination or even denying the basic rights of 
citizenship to many of our fellow Americans.
While this is no longer the case, this dark side of 
our shared history has created a multigenerational
—almost inherited—mistrust between many 
communities of color and their law enforcement 
agencies.
Many officers who do not share this 
common heritage often struggle to 
comprehend the reasons behind this 
historic mistrust. As a result, they are 
often unable to bridge this gap and connect 
with some segments of their communities.
While we obviously cannot change the 
past, it is clear that we must change the 
future. We must move forward together to 
build a shared understanding. We must 
forge a path that allows us to move beyond 
our history and identify common solutions 
to better protect our communities.
For our part, the first step in this 
process is for law enforcement and the 
IACP to acknowledge and apologize for 
the actions of the past and the role that 
our profession has played in society’s 
historical mistreatment of communities of color.
At the same time, those who denounce the police 
must also acknowledge that today’s officers are not 
to blame for the injustices of the past. If either side 
in this debate fails to acknowledge these 
fundamental truths, we will be unlikely to move 
past them.
Overcoming this historic mistrust requires that we 
must move forward together in an atmosphere of 
mutual respect. All members of our society must 
realize that we have a mutual obligation to work 
together to ensure fairness, dignity, security, and 
justice.
It is my hope that, by working together, we can 
break this historic cycle of mistrust and build a 
better and safer future for us all.”
“For our part, the 
first step in this 
process is for law 
enforcement and 
the IACP to 
acknowledge and 
apologize for the 
actions of the 
past and the role 
that our 
profession has 
played in society’s 
historical 
mistreatment of 
communities of 
color.”
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REASONABLE	SUSPICION	
INVOLVES	POSSIBILITIES,	NOT	
PROBABILITIES
R. v. Schouten, 2016 ONCA 872
The accused was stopped during  a 
R.I.D.E. program set up to deter and 
detect impaired driving. There were no 
signs of impaired driving  noted when 
the officer motioned for the accused’s 
truck to stop. When the officer approached the 
truck, he immediately detected an odour of alcohol 
on the accused’s breath and told him so. The 
accused indicated that he  had his last drink about 
10 hours earlier but did not know how much or 
what he drank. A roadside  breath demand followed 
and the  accused failed the test. He was arrested for 
driving  over 80mg% and taken to the police station 
where  he provided two samples over the legal limit 
– 120mg% and 109mg%. He was charged 
accordingly.
Ontario Court of Justice
The officer testified that he formed a 
suspicion that the accused had alcohol 
in his body based on the odour of 
alcohol on his breath and his answers to 
questions, even though he displayed no signs of 
impairment. The officer also said that he knew, from 
his training  as a  breath technician, that alcohol 
would be eliminated from a person’s body in four to 
five hours if they had “a  drink”. The officer also 
stated that, even when an odour of alcohol is 
detected, alcohol consumed 10 hours earlier “may 
have been eliminated” and it could not be said 
“with any certainty” that there would still be alcohol 
in the person’s body.
Taking  into account all of the circumstances, the 
judge found that the police officer lacked reasonable 
grounds to suspect the accused had alcohol in his 
body despite smelling  alcohol on his breath. The 
accused’s statement that he  consumed alcohol some 
10 hours earlier would explain the odour on his 
breath but, without more, did not mean there was 
still alcohol in his body at the time of the  stop. Since 
the officer lacked the necessary suspicion, the 
roadside test breached the accused’s rights under s. 
8  of the  Charter (search or seizure)  and his breath 
sample was excluded as evidence. The accused was 
acquitted.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
A Crown appeal was unsuccessful. 
Although the appeal judge agreed an 
odour of breath alcohol alone could 
found a reasonable suspicion in the 
presence of alcohol, he concluded that the officer’s 
evidence included more than just an odour of 
alcohol. Rather, there were  no signs of impairment, 
the accused was polite  and cooperative, he followed 
all of the officer’s directions without difficulty and 
said he had consumed alcohol 10 hours earlier. As 
well, the officer, a trained breath technician, could 
not say with certainty that a person who stopped 
drinking  10 hours earlier would still have alcohol in 
their body. The accused’s acquittal was upheld.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The Crown then initiated a 
further appeal. In the Crown’s 
view, the facts as found by the 
trial judge did amount to 
reasonable grounds to suspect that the accused had 
alcohol in his body and the absence of impairment 
did not render the  officer’s suspicion unreasonable. 
Justice Simmons, speaking  for the Court of Appeal, 
agreed with the Crown. “It is not necessary that a 
person show signs of impairment to found a basis for 
making  a roadside breath demand. Nor is it 
necessary  that a police officer suspect the person is 
committing  a crime,” said Simmons. “All that is 
“All that is required is that the police 
officer making the demand has 
reasonable grounds to suspect that a 
person has alcohol in their body. …  
Moreover, the standard of ‘reasonable 
grounds to suspect’ involves possibilities, 
not probabilities.”
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required is that the police  officer making  the 
demand has reasonable grounds to suspect that a 
person has alcohol in their body. … Moreover, the 
standard of ‘reasonable grounds to suspect’ involves 
possibilities, not probabilities.” She continued:
The absence of the indicia of impairment even 
when combined with the fact that the [accused] 
claimed to have consumed his last drink 10 
hours earlier did not negate the possibility that 
the [accused] had alcohol in his system, which 
was raised by the presence of an odour of 
alcohol on his breath and his admission of 
consumption.
The [accused] could not tell the officer how 
much or what he had had to drink. Even if the 
officer believed the [accused’s] statement about 
when he had his last drink, the fact that his last 
drink was 10 hours earlier – even when 
combined with the absence of indicia of 
impairment – did not negative the possibility that 
he still had alcohol in his body. Accordingly, the 
fact that, on the [accused’s] version of the timing 
of his alcohol consumption, the alcohol may 
have been eliminated from his body did not 
negate the reasonableness of the officer’s 
grounds for suspecting  the presence of alcohol – 
the odour of alcohol and the admission of 
consumption. [paras. 29-30]
As for the officer’s evidence about elimination rates 
providing  an alternative explanation for the presence 
of the alcohol breath odour, the officer agreed at 
trial that alcohol may have been eliminated, not 
would have been eliminated. This evidence did not 
exclude the possibility that the accused had alcohol 
in his body and therefore did not negate the 
reasonableness of the officer’s grounds for suspecting 
the presence of alcohol. The Crown’s appeal was 
allowed, the accused’s acquittal was set aside and a 
new trial was ordered.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
SUPREME	COURT	SPLIT	IN	
UPHOLDING	GROUNDS	FOR	
ARREST
R. v. Diamond, 2016 SCC 46
A police officer stopped a pick-up 
truck at 12:55 am on a  remote road 
for travelling  80 km/h in a 50 zone. 
He radioed in the licence number 
and was advised to be cautious 
because  the registered owner had earlier been 
arrested for drugs and possessed a scanner and knife 
at that time. As the officer approached the vehicle, 
he saw a police scanner above the driver-side 
window visor. When the accused leaned over to 
check his glove box for the registration document, 
the officer saw some money he had been sitting  on. 
The officer then shone his flashlight on "an 
unsheathed hunting  type knife” within the accused’s 
reach in the driver-side door pouch. 
The accused was arrested for possessing  a weapon 
dangerous to the public peace, placed in handcuffs 
and patted-down at the roadside. A small bag  of 
cocaine fell from his clothing. The accused was 
advised of his right to counsel, which he declined, 
and was given the standard police caution. Another 
28  small bags totaling  12 grams of cocaine was 
discovered during  a subsequent strip-
search at the police station. The 
accused was charged with possessing 
cocaine for the purpose of trafficking 
and possessing  a weapon dangerous to 
the public peace.
Newfoundland Provincial Court
The accused argued that his rights under 
ss. 8  and 9 of the Charter were breached. 
In his view, among  other things, the 
officer lacked the necessary grounds 
upon which to justify the  arrest for possessing  the 
weapon for a  dangerous purpose. However, the 
judge found the officer had the necessary reasonable 
grounds under s. 495(1) of the Criminal Code for the 
offence of possessing  a weapon for a purpose 
dangerous to the public peace. The searches that 
uncovered the cocaine were therefore reasonable. 
The accused was convicted of both charges.
Note-able Quote
“Success is going  from failure  to failure without 
losing your enthusiasm.” - Sir Winston Churchill
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Newfoundland Court of Appeal
The accused again contended, in 
part, that the discovery of the 
knife alone was insufficient to 
justify his initial arrest. He 
submitted that the pat-down and strip searches 
which revealed the cocaine were therefore 
unreasonable. In his opinion, all of the evidence 
should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the 
Charter. 
Justice Harrington, speaking  for a two-member 
majority of the Court of Appeal, agreed with the trial 
judge that the accused’s arrest was lawful. Not only 
did the officer have the required subjective belief (as 
the accused conceded), the  belief was also 
objectively reasonable in all the circumstances. 
Although Justice Harrington cautioned that not every 
instance of an unsheathed knife located in a door 
pocket beside the driver of a vehicle would properly 
found a basis for arrest, the totality of the 
circumstances in this case not only included the 
presence of the knife but also the following:
(i) The knife was located on the 
driver's side, where it would be 
most easily accessible;
(ii) It was unsheathed. If the knife was 
related to illegal drug activity, it 
would be advantageous to have it 
unsheathed for quicker access;
(iii) Involvement in the drug trade can 
be a motive to carry a weapon for 
a purpose dangerous to the public;
(iv) The officer knew the [accused] 
had previously been arrested for 
possession of drugs;
(v) The [accused] was carrying  a 
machete type knife when he was 
last arrested for possession of 
drugs;
(vi) The [accused's] vehicle was 
carrying a police scanner. That is a 
known drug-trafficking accessory; 
and
(vii) The [accused] was carrying  a police 
scanner the last time he was arrested for 
possession of drugs [para. 25].
Since the arrest for possessing  a weapon dangerous 
to the public peace was lawful, the seizure of the 
cocaine was justifiable incidental to the accused’s 
arrest. The accused’s appeal was dismissed and his 
convictions were upheld. 
Justice White, in a dissenting  opinion, concluded 
that the accused’s arrest was unlawful because the 
officer did not objectively have reasonable grounds. 
This rendered his arrest a breach under s. 9 of the 
Charter and the searches incidental to it were 
unreasonable under s. 8. Justice White would have 
excluded all of the  evidence under s. 24(2)  and 
entered acquittals on the charges.
Supreme Court of Canada 
The accused argued, 
among  other things, that 
the Court of Appeal erred 
in determining  that his 
arrest for possessing  the  knife  was lawful. However, 
in a short judgment, his appeal was dismissed by a 
3:2 margin. Justice  Karakatsanis, speaking  for herself 
and two other justices, agreed substantially with 
Justice Harrington’s reasons of the Newfoundland 
Court of Appeal in upholding the accused’s arrest. 
Justice Gascon and Côté, in dissent, would have 
allowed the  accused’s appeal for the reasons of 
Justice White. 
Editor’s Note: Case facts taken from R. v. Diamond, 
2015 NLCA 60.
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Resisting Arrest
“In order to prove a charge of 
resisting arrest, the actions of the 
accused must constitute ‘active 
resistance’ and not ‘passive 
resistance’. ... [T]the offence of resisting a peace 
officer requires more than being uncooperative: it 
requires active physical resistance.” - Ontario Court 
of Appeal in R. v. Kennedy, 2016 ONCA 879 at paras. 31 and 36.
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
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STATISTICAL	EVIDENCE	NOT	
REQUIRED	FOR	REASONABLE	
SUSPICION
R. v. Franc, 2016 SKCA 129 
Believing  there was a sufficient basis 
to suspect that traff icking  was 
occurring  at a bar, the police set up  an 
undercover operation. While in the 
bar, two undercover officers met the 
accused and eventually discussed smoking 
marihuana on the patio. During  this conversation, 
the accused offered the officers a marijuana pipe. 
The officers declined but hinted they wanted another 
type of narcotic. By the end of their conversation, 
the accused said he would supply two grams of 
cocaine at the  price of $100 per gram. When the 
accused told the officers the cocaine had arrived, the 
three  left the tavern. The accused introduced the 
officers to another man who was sitting  in the front 
passenger seat of a car. The officers and the  accused 
got into the car and sat in the back. The  other man 
gave each of the officers a gram of cocaine and took 
$200. Then, before departing, all parties exchanged 
phone numbers. The accused was subsequently 
charged with cocaine trafficking.
Saskatchewan Provincial Court
The judge found the accused guilty of 
the charge  but entered a stay of 
proceedings on the basis that the 
accused had been entrapped. The 
Crown had tried to rely on the following  evidence to 
establish a  reasonable suspicion sufficient to offer 
the accused an opportunity to commit the offence:
• Police testimony that the bar was a “known” 
location where drug trafficking takes place;
• Convicted drug  dealers had been seen at the bar 
(although only one could be named);  
• Information had been received from “proven reliable 
confidential informants”, who had stated there was 
drug trafficking  occurring  at the bar although no 
further detail was provided; 
• People had been personally observed by one of the 
officers who he knew to be involved in the drug 
trade and to have been charged with offences – but 
no names were given; 
• A cell phone had been seized during a previous 
drug investigation at the bar and a caller indicated 
that a delivery would be made at that location; and 
• An officer had made one cocaine purchase at the 
bar two days earlier. 
 
In the judge’s view, the evidence did “not establish a 
reasonable suspicion that this physical location was 
one where the activity in question is likely 
occurring”. The police  testimony only referenced 
“one particular instance” of cocaine trafficking  at the 
bar and the  information was of a general nature. 
There was no specific information or details on 
previous convictions for trafficking  arising  from 
investigations at the bar. 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
The Crown argued, among 
other things, that the trial judge 
applied the wrong  standard to 
determine whether the accused 
had been entrapped and improperly assessed the 
relevant evidence on the issue. 
Entrapment
Entrapment can occur when 
t h e p o l i c e p r e s e n t a n 
opportunity for a person to 
commit an offence without a 
reasonable suspicion (i)  the person is already 
engaged in the particular criminal activity or (ii) the 
physical location with which the person is 
associated is a place where the particular criminal 
activity is likely occurring. 
In this case, the police did not have a reasonable 
suspicion the accused was already engaged in 
trafficking  cocaine. However, the police  had an 
objectively supportable subjective suspicion that the 
bar was a place where trafficking  was occurring. This 
was so even though police lacked specific 
knowledge that convictions had been obtained as a 
result of police investigations at the  bar and they 
only  made generalized statements regarding  what 
was occurring at the bar.  
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Justice Jackson, speaking  for the Court of Appeal, 
found the trial judge applied too high of a standard 
for reasonable suspicion. The test does not require 
that the Crown prove a probability that drug 
trafficking  was taking  place at the bar. Rather, the 
test is whether the evidence established that the 
police had a reasonable  suspicion trafficking  was 
occurring  at that location. Statistical evidence is not 
required to establish a reasonable suspicion that a 
location is one where  it is reasonably suspected that 
certain criminal activity is occurring:
In my respectful view, the trial judge was overly 
concerned about the fact that none of the 
officers knew exactly how many of the arrests 
that had been made at Rogues Tavern had 
resulted in convictions. On three occasions the 
trial judge refers to the officers’ inability to 
provide statistics regarding  convictions of drug 
trafficking in support of his finding  that the 
officers had no specific evidence that drug 
trafficking was taking place at Rogues Tavern. 
However, the officers were not required to offer 
statistical evidence to establish a reasonable 
suspicion. This sets the bar too high. [para. 34]
The Court of Appeal then set out a number of 
general principles arising  from the case of R. v. 
Chehil, 2013  SCC 49 that apply to the assessment of 
whether the police have a reasonable suspicion that 
trafficking is occurring in a designated location: 
(a) “[r]easonable suspicion must be assessed 
against the totality of the circumstances. 
The inquiry must consider the constellation 
of objectively discernible facts that are said 
to give the investigating  officer reasonable 
cause to suspect”; 
(b) the constellation of factors will not ground 
reasonable suspicion where they merely 
amount to a “‘generalized’ suspicion” 
(c) factors that may “go both ways” by 
themselves may not support reasonable 
suspicion, but do not preclude reasonable 
suspicion arising when they form part of 
the constellation of factors; 
(d) “reasonable suspicion need not be the only 
inference that can be drawn from a 
particular constellation of factors”; 
(e) “[e]xculpatory, neutral, or equivocal 
information cannot be disregarded when 
assessing a constellation of factors”; 
(f) the “obligation of the police to take all 
factors into account” does not require the 
police to further investigate or seek 
exculpatory factors or rule out possible 
innocent explanations; and 
(g) when conducting  an “inquiry to ascertain 
whether reasonable suspicion was present, 
the court will assess the circumstances the 
police were aware of at the time of 
execution of the search”.  [page numbers 
omitted, para. 36]
Here, the constellation of factors reviewed by the 
trial judge satisfied the reasonable suspicion 
threshold. “In my respectful view, considering  all of 
these factors, they are sufficient to ground a 
reasonable  suspicion that drug  trafficking  was 
occurring  at Rogues Tavern, and it was an error of 
law for the trial judge to find otherwise,” said Justice 
Jackson. “The individual statements would not have 
been sufficient, but taking  all of the factors together, 
objectively speaking, they are sufficient to have 
allowed the police to engage [the accused] in a 
discussion about buying  cocaine.” The trial judge 
erred in law by reaching the contrary conclusion. 
The accused had not been entrapped. The Crown’s 
appeal was allowed, the stay  of proceedings was set 
aside, a conviction was entered and the matter was 
remitted back to the trial judge for sentencing.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
“The individual statements would not 
have been sufficient, but taking all of 
the factors together, objectively 
speaking, they are sufficient to have 
allowed the police to engage [the 
accused] in a discussion about buying 
cocaine.”
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HOMICIDE	BY	THE	NUMBERS
According  to a recently  released Statistics Canada 
report, “Homicide in Canada, 2015” , there were 83 
more homicides in 2015 than the year before 
(2014). This accounts for a 15% increase in the 
homicide rate and marks the highest homicide rate 
since 2011. Only three provinces/territories reported 
a decrease in the number of homicides (Prince 
Edward Island, Yukon and Nunavut) while  all others 
saw an increase. Alberta  had the  largest increase in 
homicides, with 27 more homicides in 2015 than in 
2014. Ontario had the most homicides with 174 
while Prince Edward Island and the Yukon only had 
one each. 
Guns & Gangs
Of the 178  homicides involving  firearms, the 
weapon of choice was a  handgun. The Montreal 
Census Metropolitan Area had the  highest 
percentage of gang-related homicides (43%) 
followed by Abbotsford-Mission (33%), Calgary 
(32%), and London, Ottawa, and Hamilton, each at 
29%.  Sixteen percent (16%)  of homicides were 
gang related.
Homicides by Province/Territory
Area Homicides Change 
Over 2015
Rate per 100,000
British Columbia 95 +6 2.03
Alberta 133 +27 3.17
Saskatchewan 43 +19 3.79
Manitoba 47 +2 3.63
Ontario 174 +18 1.26
Quebec 77 +7 0.93
Newfoundland 3 +1 0.57
Nova Scotia 12 +6 1.27
New Brunswick 11 +1 1.46
Prince Edward Island 1 -2 0.68
Yukon 1 -2 2.67
North West Territories 5 +2 11.34
Nunavut 2 -2 5.42
Canada 604 +83 1.68
98 Number of gang related homicides. 22%
Rate increase of 
attempted murders.
75% Percentage of homicides solved.
Police reported solving 451 of Canada’s 604 
homicides in 2015. There were 525 accused 
persons identified in these incidents.
Alberta had 28 gang-related homicides with 
68% occurring in the CMAs of Calgary and 
Edmonton.
There were 144 more attempted murders in 
2015 compared to 2014.
572Number of homicides involving a single victim.
95% of homicide incidents involved a single 
victim. There were 21 incidents (4%) involving 
two victims and 5 incidents involving 3 or 4 
victims (<1%).
Handgun
Most commonly 
used firearm.
There were 178 firearm-related homicides.            
Of those, 101 involved a handgun. 37 a shotgun or 
rifle, 23 a sawed-off shotgun or rifle and 17 another 
firearm type. 
39% Alberta homicides by shooting.
Alberta had the highest provincial percentage of 
homicide victims by shooting, followed by 
Quebec (36%), Newfoundland (33%)            
and BC (30%). There were 39                           
homicides in each of Edmonton and Calgary.
Source: Statistics Canada, 2016, “Homicide in Canada, 2015”, 
catalogue no. 85-002-X, November 23, 2016.
The homicide rate in 2015 was higher outside census 
metropolitan areas (CMAs).
In 2015, there were 604 VICTIMS 
of homicide in Canada, 83 more 
than in 2014.
The homicide rate in 2015 INCREASED BY 15% from the previous year, 
but is still 2% lower than the average rate from 2005 to 2014.
Aboriginal people represented about 5% of Canada’s 
total population in 2015 yet ACCOUNTED FOR A HIGHER 
PERCENTAGE OF HOMICIDE VICTIMS AND ACCUSED PERSONS.
In 2015, the MAJORITY OF 
HOMICIDE VICTIMS were MALE. 
In 2015, 87% OF VICTIMS KNEW THE ACCUSED.     
The reported relationships between victims 
and accused were:
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
201520132011200920072005
Average rate from 2005 to 2014
3.223.30
AMONG CMAs, THE FIVE HIGHEST 
HOMICIDE RATES WERE REPORTED IN: TOTAL NON-CMAs   2.03
TOTAL CMAs   1.54
ABORIGINAL
NON-ABORIGINAL 
UNKNOWN
VICTIMS
25%
74%
1%
ACcUSED
33%
66%
2%
2.702.72
THE MOST COMMON METHODS OF HOMICIDE in 2015 were:
CALGARYREGINA EDMONTON WINNIPEGSASKATOON
37%
STABBING
30%
SHOOTING
23%
BEATING
10%
OTHER METHODS
(suffocation, motor vehicle 
impact, fire, poisoning, etc.)
Rate per 100,000 population
Rate per 100,000 population
MALE VICTIMS FEMALE VICTIMS 
29%71%
Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre 
for Justice Statistics, Homicide Survey.
2.0
2.87
12% CRIMINAL PARTNER 
22% OTHER FAMILY MEMBER
4% OTHER
INTIMATE PARTNER
(excludes spouse)
35% ACQUAINTANCE 13% STRANGER
14% SPOUSE 
HOMICIDE IN CANADA 2015WwW.STATCAN.GC.CA
604
VICTIMS
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MINOR	DIFFERENCES	IN	
INFORMER	DESCRIPTIONS	MAY	
ENHANCE	CREDIBILITY	 
R. v. Parsley, 2016 NLCA 51
Two confidential informers provided 
information to the police independent 
of each other. The police also took 
steps to independently corroborate the 
information. They checked records 
and found that Stephen Parsley of 509 Empire Ave. 
in Newfoundland had been searched on a previous 
occasion and was found to possess marihuana in 
New Brunswick in 2013. He was charged that time 
but Crown withdrew the charge because the search 
took place prior to lawful arrest. 
The police also drove by 509 Empire Ave. and noted 
the house was blue with a black door, the number 
509 was affixed to the left of the door, it was the 
second house in from the  intersection of Empire Ave. 
and Columbus Dr., there were two outbuildings at its 
rear and there  was security  system signage in the 
window of the house. As well, the home was 
registered to Paul and Yvonne Parsley. Based on this 
information, the police obtained a search warrant for 
the home and found drugs. The accused was 
charged with possessing  and trafficking  in cocaine 
and marihuana, and possessing ecstasy. 
Newfoundland Provincial Court
 The accused challenged the validity of 
the warrant on the basis that the 
grounds set out in the  ITO were 
insufficient. The judge agreed, holding 
that the ITO did not satisfy the “credibly based 
probability” threshold. The 
judge noted that Source A 
had provided information to 
the police on numerous 
occasions but only a few 
arrests resulted. Therefore, 
the search warrant should 
not have been issued and the 
search became warrantless. 
The evidence was excluded 
under s. 24(2)  and the 
accused was acquitted.
Newfoundland Court of Appeal
The Crown asserted that 
the trial judge erred in 
finding  the ITO contained 
i n s u f f i c i e n t r e l i a b l e 
information such the warrant could not be 
issued. In the Crown’s view, the trial judge 
failed to apply the correct standard and took a 
piecemeal approach to the evidence in the ITO 
rather than considering  the totality of the 
circumstances. The accused, on the other hand, 
submitted the information in the ITO was not 
compelling  because it was not sufficiently 
detailed.  
The Source Info
Source A
Date Received: April 28, 2014
➡ Snips’ real name is Stephen Parsley of Mundy Pond area;
➡ Snips has two garages one he does coke deals out of and 
the other has two cars one of which is a corvette that is 
brown or copper where he hides cash;
➡ Snips has a large amount of coke in his garage;
➡ Snips is moving a lot of weight with [a named individual];
➡ Snips’ coke can be cut three times.
➡ “SNIPS” has cameras in his house that send footage to 
his cell phone and he uses his cell phone to arrange drug 
deals.
Date Received: May 1, 2014: 
➡ Stephen Parsley AKA “Snips” has a lot of good quality 
coke;
➡ Stephen Parsley lives at 509 Empire Avenue;
➡ Stephen Parsley has weed in his garage; and
➡ Stephen Parsley keeps the cash from his drug sales in his 
house.
Source B
Date Received: April 30, 2014
➡ Steve Parsley, “Snips”, lives on Empire Avenue in the 
second house in from Columbus Drive.  He is really big 
into cocaine and always has it on hand.  He keeps it in his 
shed and also uses his uncle’s shed next door.  He deals 
in kilos but will sell in ounces; and
➡ He sells mostly cocaine and weed.
“The search and 
seizure of evidence 
pursuant to an invalid 
or illegally obtained 
warrant amounts to a 
violation of an 
accused’s section 8 
Charter right.”
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Search Warrants
Under the law, a “search and seizure of evidence 
pursuant to an invalid or illegally obtained warrant 
amounts to a violation of an accused’s section 8 
Charter right.” One way a warrant may later be 
determined to be invalid is if it was issued on 
insufficient grounds. Respecting  the reasonable 
grounds standard, Justice Hoegg wrote:
That standard composes both a subjective prong 
and an objective prong.  In practice, that means 
that the officer swearing the ITO must have a 
subjective belief that on the basis of the stated 
grounds, the search requested will yield 
evidence respecting the commission of an 
offence and also that objective assessment of the 
grounds justifies issuance of the warrant. The test 
is the same for determining grounds for arrest, 
although the objective component has been 
applied in a less exacting manner in reviewing 
grounds for arrest than in reviewing the issuance 
of an ITO. [para. 10]
As for the objective prong  of the  test, the Court of 
Appeal noted it has been described in various ways 
by other courts including the following descriptions: 
• “reasonable probability” rather than “proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt” or “prima facie case”; 
• “some evidence that might reasonably be believed 
on the basis of which the authorization could have 
issued”; 
• “whether there was sufficient credible and reliable 
evidence” to permit a finding  of reasonable and 
probable grounds to issue the warrant; 
• “whether there was reliable evidence that might 
reasonably be believed on the basis of which the 
authorization could issue”. 
Furthermore, “in applying  the standard, the 
reviewing  judge must consider ‘the totality of the 
circumstances’ set out in the ITO, and approach the 
task from a ‘holistic perspective rather than a 
microscopic perspective’ which deconstructs the 
ITO and inspects each piece of information in it.”
Using Informer Information
When the grounds in an ITO include or are 
substantially based on confidential source 
information three factors will be considered: 
 
• Was the information predicting  the commission 
of a criminal offence compelling?  
• Where that information was based on a ‘tip’ 
originating  from a source outside  the police, 
was the source credible?  
• Was the information corroborated by police 
investigation prior to making  the decision to 
conduct the search?  
Each of these factors does not constitute a separate 
test. Rather, weaknesses in one area may be 
compensated by strengths in the other two. As for 
corroboration, Justice Hoegg stated:
As well, it is worth restating  that there is no legal 
requirement that confidential source information 
be independently corroborated in whole or in 
part. Where the informant is a confidential 
source of “known identity” and “proven 
rel iabi l i ty”, the need for independent 
corroboration of the information is less 
important and not required as a rule of law. 
[para. 17]
In this case, there was no issue with the swearing 
officer’s subjective  belief. As for the  objective 
assessment, there was sufficient credible and reliable 
evidence set out in the ITO for the warrant to be 
issued. The Court of Appeal found the trial judge 
committed several errors in evaluating  the grounds 
set out in the ITO such as:
• Assessing  Source A’s and Source B’s reliability, 
and in focusing  on the inconsequential 
“[T]here is no legal requirement that confidential source information be independently 
corroborated in whole or in part. Where the informant is a confidential source of ‘known 
identity’ and ‘proven reliability’, the need for independent corroboration of the 
information is less important and not required as a rule of law.”
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differences between the information provided 
by them;
• Focusing  on what the police were unable to 
corroborate as opposed to what they were able 
to corroborate and by concentrating  on 
information that he thought ought to have been 
included in the ITO; 
• Determining  that some of the evidence in the 
ITO was irrelevant when it was not; and 
• Focusing  on the extraneous information in the 
ITO rather than on the information that was in 
the ITO that could support its issuance.  
Differences in the Informer Info
The trial judge focused on the differences between 
the information from Source A and Source B, but 
differences are to be expected:
The informat ion provided by the two 
independent informants was not contradictory. 
Describing  the location of the drugs in a shed as 
opposed to a garage or an outbuilding is not, in 
the context of this case, a meaningful difference. 
Neither does information from Source A that 
“Snips has a large amount of coke in his garage” 
and “Snips has a lot of good quality coke” 
contradict information from Source B that Snips 
is “really big  into cocaine” and “always got it on 
hand” in the context of this case.
The Judge’s focus on finding differences in the 
ways that Sources A and B described information 
is not the task of a reviewing Judge. Minor 
differences in descriptions are to be expected 
when information comes from different people. 
In fact, such minor differences may enhance the 
credibility of the information. Two people 
seldom use the same words to describe the same 
event. By focusing on minor differences in 
descriptions and the inclusion of extraneous 
information, the Judge failed to take a holistic 
approach to the totality of the circumstances. 
His microscopic approach diverted him from 
considering  the considerable remaining  and 
detailed information in the totality of the 
circumstances.  Moreover, and very significantly, 
two confidential informants provided similar 
information to their handlers independently of 
each other and within a day of each other.  The 
Judge failed to consider this fact in his analysis, 
and his failure to do so was an error. [para. 
32-33]
Focusing  Only on Successful Arrests or 
Prosecutions 
The trial judge considered the fact that the 
information previously provided by  the informers’ 
resulted in only a  few arrests. “While a ‘successful’ 
“While a ‘successful’ arrest or prosecution can be evidence of reliability, it does not follow 
that because there was no ‘successful arrest or prosecution’ the information is unreliable.
Many factors go into a police decision to seek a search warrant or to arrest someone, 
and because they do not choose to do so every time they are provided with information 
does not mean the information is not reliable.”
Degree of Detail
Source A
➡ identified the accused by name and by nickname, 
➡ reported that Mr. Parsley had cocaine and marihuana in 
garages at the rear of 509 Empire Avenue.  
➡ described the quantity of cocaine as “a large amount” and “a 
lot” and its quality as “can be cut three times” and “good”.  
➡ indicated that Mr. Parsley had a security system which 
enabled him to monitor the property and arrange deals 
from his cell phone.
Source B
➡ identified Mr. Parsley by name and nickname, 
➡ advised that he had cocaine and weed stored in a shed 
behind his house on Empire Avenue which was the second 
one in from Columbus Drive. 
➡ said that the first house on Empire in from Columbus Drive 
was owned by a relative of Mr. Parsley who permitted the 
accused to store drugs in a shed on that property.  
➡ Previous informer information, given to police by Source B 
in 2013, was also reviewed.  It related that Source B had told 
his handler that drugs seized in a search in 2013 belonged to 
Snips and another named individual. 
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arrest or prosecution can be evidence of reliability, it 
does not follow that because there was no 
‘successful arrest or prosecution’ the information is 
unreliable,” said Justice Hoegg. “Many factors go 
into a police decision to seek a  search warrant or to 
arrest someone, and because they do not choose to 
do so every  time they  are provided with information 
does not mean the information is not reliable.”
Relying on the Traffic Stop Info
The trial judge found that the information relating  to 
the traffic  stop incident in New Brunswick in 2013 
could not be  relied upon to support reasonable 
grounds even though it could connect Stephen 
Parsley of 509 Empire Ave. in to an illegal drug  – one 
of the same drugs involved in this matter. The Court 
of Appeal, noting  that the information was dated and 
of slight weight, found such information was not 
i r relevant. “ In the absence of a judicial 
determination that the  evidence was obtained in 
breach of [the accused’s] Charter rights, it was not 
open to the Judge to exclude this information from 
consideration,” said the Court of Appeal.
After the extraneous information was excised from 
the ITO, the Court of Appeal ruled that “there is 
sufficient detailed information provided by two 
reliable  informers independently of each other and 
some other information in the ITO on which the 
search warrant was lawfully  issued.” Since the 
grounds in the ITO were sufficient, the warrant was 
valid, there was no s. 8 breach and no need to resort 
to s. 24(2). 
The Crown’s Appeal was allowed, the accused’s 
acquittal set aside and a new trial was ordered.
A Slightly Different Opinion
Justice Rowe, although in agreement with 
the result and generally with the 
majority’s line of reasoning, put matters in 
a more simple way. “The trial judge in 
reviewing  the ITO substituted his view for that of the 
issuing  judge; that is not his role,” he said. “It is, 
rather, to determine whether there was a  proper 
basis on which the issuing  judge could have 
authorized the search warrant.”  However,  he would 
place no reliance on the 2013 New Brunswick arrest 
and questioned the propriety of including  it in the 
ITO.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
REVIEWING	JUDGE	NOT	TO	
SUBSTITUTE	THEIR	OPINION	ON	
WHETHER	WARRANT	SHOULD	
HAVE	BEEN	ISSUED
R. v. Roach, 2016 NBCA 61
The police obtained a search warrant 
under s. 11 of the Controlled Drugs 
and Substances Act based upon 
in fo rma t ion p rov ided by f ive 
confidential informers, surveillance of 
the accused’s apartment, surveillance of persons 
visiting  his apartment and garbage bags retrieved 
from the curb outside his residence. Within the 
garbage bags police found a restaurant delivery 
receipt with his surname written upon it and six 
small plastic bags containing  a residue which “field-
tests showed positive  for cocaine”. The warrant 
authorized the search of the accused’s apartment 
and his vehicle  for evidence related to trafficking  a 
controlled substance and possession for the purpose 
of trafficking. 
When police executed the warrant they found the 
accused’s door unlocked and no one in the 
apartment. A small bag  of marihuana, a bag 
containing  5.87 grams of cocaine, empty bags 
containing  a residue which tested positive for 
cocaine, a  digital scale, two score sheets, and a 
money counting  machine were located inside. A 
vehicle search uncovered two bags containing  1.96 
and 1.02 grams of cocaine and $2,950 in cash 
Reliability of Informers
➡ The indicia of reliability of Sources A and B was set out in 
the ITO.  
➡ Both sources were believed to be highly credible and to 
have provided reliable information on which successful 
police investigations and prosecutions had been based over 
significant periods of time 
➡ The ITO set out the history of both sources’ proven 
reliability with respect to information provided to their 
respective handler/s over the years.  The fact the word 
“reliable” was not used in the ITO did not matter as the 
ITO clearly speaks to the reliability of Sources A and B..
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hidden in a  hockey skate. He was charged with drug 
related offences.
New Brunswick Provincial Court
The accused attacked the issuance of the 
search warrant making  several assertions 
that it was invalid. These included such 
things as:
• The reliability of the informants - the information 
was unconf i rmed and was s ta le and/or 
uncorroborated;
• Certain aspects of the surveillance notes did not 
correspond to wording used in the ITO;
• The identification of the owner of the trash taken 
in the “garbage grab” conducted by the police;
• The affiant failed to disclose in the ITO that he had 
requested a fingerprint analysis on the trash taken;
• The affiant depended on the uncorroborated 
statement of a source that the accused travelled to 
Toronto to purchase drugs; and
• The lack of information to establish drugs would 
be located in the accused’s vehicle.
The trial judge, in reviewing  the warrant, considered 
these issues, disposed of each and upheld the 
warrant. The judge found the ITO did not contain 
instances of fraud, non-disclosure or misleading 
evidence. “Although each of the parts are  not in and 
of themselves enough to provide the reasonable 
grounds for the issuance of a search warrant, the 
court must view the entire ITO, its weaknesses and 
strengths and whether one part reinforces another 
part,” said the judge. “Taken as a whole there is 
adequate information provided from sources and 
surveillance and real evidence found in the  garbage 
grab  for the issuing  Judge to decide, that there  was a 
credibly  based probability that an offence had been 
committed and that there would be evidence of it to 
be found in the residence and the vehicle.” The 
evidence was admissible and the accused was 
convicted.
New Brunswick Court of Appeal
The accused contended, in part, 
that the trial judge erred in 
concluding  that reasonable 
grounds existed for the  issuance 
of the search warrant. But the Court of Appeal 
disagreed. In its view, the trial judge properly 
considered the totality of the  information while 
interpreting  its constituent parts in context. A judge 
reviewing  a search warrant is not to substitute their 
view for that of the judge issuing  it. Instead, if the 
information before the issuing  judge is such that the 
warrant could have been issued then the reviewing 
judge should not interfere with the warrant. In this 
case, the  Court of Appeal was not to engage in a 
review of the issuing  judge’s decision in granting  the 
search warrant and the trial judge did not err in 
upholding  its validity. There was no s. 8  Charter 
breach and therefore s. 24(2)  did not apply. The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
BY THE BOOK:
Search	Warrant: Controlled Drugs & Substances Act
s. 11 (1) A justice who, on ex parte application, 
is satisfied by information on oath that there 
are reasonable grounds to believe that
(a) a controlled substance or precursor in respect of which 
this Act has been contravened,
(b) any thing in which a controlled substance or precursor 
referred to in paragraph (a) is contained or concealed,
(c) offence-related property, or
(d) any thing that will afford evidence in respect of an 
offence under this Act or an offence, in whole or in part 
in relation to a contravention of this Act, under section 
354 or 462.31 of the Criminal Code
is in a place may, at any time, issue a warrant authorizing a 
peace officer, at any time, to search the place for any such 
controlled substance, precursor, property or thing and to 
seize it.
Note-able Quote
“You can easily judge the character of a man by how 
he treats those who can do nothing  for him.” - 
Malcolm S. Forbes
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Leadership Through Crisis
The Westin Bayshore | Vancouver, BC
ConferenCe and Theme
The British Columbia Association of Chiefs of Police in 
partnership with the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police 
are hosting the Police Leadership Conference in Vancouver, 
British Columbia. This is Canada’s largest police leadership 
conference. This Police Leadership Conference will provide an 
opportunity for delegates to hear leadership topics discussed by 
world-renowned speakers.
The 2017 conference theme is “Leadership Through Crisis”. 
As members of the policing community our responsibility and 
obligation, regardless of position or rank, is to lead through 
crisis, large or small. Crisis in policing is unavoidable and it is the 
time when leadership is needed the most. This conference will 
provide delegates from the police community with insights into 
what is necessary to navigate through crisis and succeed. The 
Police Leadership Conference will bring together experts who 
will provide real-life accounts of the crisis they encountered 
and their path to leadership through dark, urgent or intensely 
difficult times. The carefully chosen list of keynote speakers will 
provide a first class opportunity at a first class venue to hear 
how they decided to take action, one step at a time and do what 
was right and not necessarily easiest.
LoCaTion of ConferenCe / 
aCCommodaTions
The Westin Bayshore
1601 Bayshore Drive, Vancouver, BC
2017 Police Leadership Conference Rate:  $195 plus 
taxes per night
Call: 1-800-WESTIN-1 or 604-682-3377
Email: bayshore.reservations@westin.com
Guestrooms held until March 7, 2017  
(prices are not guaranteed after this date)
regisTraTion fee
$450 + GST ($472.50) Prior to January 1, 2017
$475 + GST ($498.75) January 1, 2017 – Conference start
For more information regarding programming, 
registration or accommodations please visit the 
Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police website at 
www.cacp.ca.  For those without internet access 
please call (613) 595-1101 for further assistance.
 
 @CaCp_aCCp
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ITO	BASED	ON	MORE	THAN	
BARE	CONCLUSORY	
STATEMENT:	RGB	SATISFIED	
R. v. Wallace, 2016 NSCA 79
The police  obtained a warrant on 
August 23, 2015 to search the 
accused’s mobile home. The home 
was described as being  blue and 
whi te in colour wi th an a i r-
conditioning  unit in the front window and a red 
baby barn at the rear. A police officer had spoken to 
a confidential informer three times over a one month 
period. The officer had known the source for eight 
months. This source had provided information 
previously used to obtain two search warrants which 
led to the seizure of controlled substances and drug 
paraphernalia, and resulted in charges. As well, this 
source had provided information found to be 
consistent with information provided by other 
confidential informants. The source was financially 
motivated to provide information and had been paid 
for it in the past. The informer had a criminal record, 
but not for misleading  the police or the courts, and 
the information provided was based on the their 
firsthand conversations or observations.
The officer was familiar with the property and 
confirmed some of its description. A check of police 
databases did not show the address as being 
associated with the accused. However, one database 
entry  disclosed that the accused had been arrested 
on August 6, 2015 and charged with four counts 
under the CDSA for possession of Hydromorph, 
Dilaudid, Codeine and Morphine. When police 
executed the warrant they found the accused in the 
bathroom and his partner in the kitchen. Drugs and 
other paraphernalia were discovered inside  the 
home. The accused was charged with drug  and 
breach of probation offences. 
Nova Scotia Provincial Court
The accused, among other things, 
challenged the validity of the search 
warrant on the basis that the ITO 
contained insufficient evidence to 
establish that reasonable grounds existed to 
authorize the warrant. He submitted that: 
• the informer’s details were not sufficient to 
establish reliability; 
• he was only known for eight months and he was 
being paid; 
• the information provided in two prior cases could 
not support reliability as the search warrants in 
those cases had not yet been tested in court; and 
• the police had not confirmed through investigation 
any of the details—in fact the police databases 
showed he was not associated with the named 
address at all. 
Despite these assertions, the warrant was upheld by 
the judge and the accused was convicted of 
possessing  cocaine for the  purpose of trafficking, 
possessing  methadone and two counts of breaching 
a probation order. He was sentenced to two years’ 
incarceration less time served. 
 
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal
The accused argued that the 
trial judge articulated the 
correct legal test for reviewing  a 
search warrant but failed to 
apply it correctly. 
The Source Info About the Accused
Date Received: July 22, 2015
➡ he lived at 24 Indian Gardens Trailer Court; 
➡ he was doing needles and selling “hydromorphs” and dilaudid 
(4 mg), and did not have a prescription for them.  
➡ he had “bud” and ounces of coke.  
Date Received: August 19, 2015 
➡ he is moving a lot of coke; 
➡ he is using and selling; 
➡ the previous week he had an ounce of coke.  
➡ he had told the source he has a .22 in the house.  
➡ details of the house were given. 
Date Received: August 23, 2015 
➡ He has coke for sale and is selling it out of his residence of 
24 Indian Gardens; 
➡ specifically, that within the last 24 hours, he had a half ounce 
of coke;
➡ he sells it for $80 to $200 a gram or $500 for a half ounce; 
➡ he also sells 4 mg Dilaudid for $15, 6 mg Hydromorph for 
$15, and 12 mg for $25. 
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Justice Beveridge, for the unanimous Court of 
Appeal, first outlined a number of points for 
reviewing  an ITO used in support of a search 
warrant:
• The reviewing judge or court does not determine 
whether the justice of the peace should have been 
satisfied on the evidence presented to him, but 
rather could he have been satisfied on the 
evidence set out in the ITO that there were 
reasonable and probable grounds for believing 
that the articles sought would be of assistance in 
establishing  the commission of an offence and 
would be found in the premises sought to be 
searched. [para. 25]
• The ITO need not demonstrate a prima facie case 
against a named person. But something more is 
required than suspicion, or the mere possibility, 
that relevant evidence of a crime may be found at 
a place. Reasonable grounds can only be said to 
exist where suspicion is replaced by credibly 
based probability. [para. 29]
• The affiant of an ITO must set out evidence under 
oath affirming  his or her subjective belief, 
supported by objective criteria, that an offence has 
been committed (or is being committed), and that 
the things to be searched for will be found at the 
place specified. The reasonable belief does not 
have to be based on personal knowledge, but, if 
based on information from a police informer, the 
reliability of the information must be apparent. 
[para. 30]
The accused submitted that because evidence of a 
tip  from an informer, by itself, is insufficient to 
establish reasonable grounds, the  information 
provided by the source in this case  could not 
support the  warrant. Although a  mere conclusory 
statement by an informer, without more, cannot 
satisfy the reasonable  grounds threshold, Justice 
Beveridge noted there was more than a bare 
conclusory statement unsupported by details, 
demonstrated reliability, or other police work. 
Rather, there were other factors to consider such as 
the degree of detail, source  of knowledge, prior 
reliability, and police confirmation of some part of 
the information. 
The Court of Appeal found the trial judge properly 
cautioned herself that she was not to substitute her 
opinion for that of the  issuing  justice, but to 
determine only if the issuing  justice  could have 
granted the authorization. The judge considered the 
detail of the tip and the informer’s reliability. Justice 
Beveridge stated: 
The affiant’s description of the information from 
the informer belies the notion that the warrant 
was based on a mere conclusionary statement. 
The trial judge rightly looked at the details 
provided by the informer. The affiant deposed 
that the informer’s information was based on his 
or her firsthand observations. This led the trial 
judge to conclude that the informer had been in 
the residence and was knowledgeable about the 
type and quantities of drugs being sold by the 
[accused].
Further, the affiant set out details that supported 
the reliability of the informer; he or she had 
provided information on two prior occasions 
that led to search warrants and consequent 
seizures of controlled substances and drug 
paraphernalia.  
It is the totality of the circumstances set out in 
the ITO that determines if mere suspicion is 
displaced by credibly based probability.  The 
trial judge was right to conclude the test was 
met.  [46-48]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
“The ITO need not demonstrate a prima 
facie case against a named person. But 
something more is required than 
suspicion, or the mere possibility, that 
relevant evidence of a crime may be found 
at a place. Reasonable grounds can only 
be said to exist where suspicion is 
replaced by credibly based probability.”
Note-able Quote
“It is a terrible thing  to see and have no vision.” - 
Helen Keller
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BREATH	TECH’s	DEMAND	AT	
POLICE	STATION	MADE	‘AS	
SOON	AS	PRACTICABLE’		
R. v. Guenter, 2016 ONCA 572
Police attended the accident scene 
where  the accused’s Nissan Pathfinder 
ran into a  Hyundai Accent, injuring 
three  of the four occupants of the 
Hyundai. An officer approached the 
Pathfinder and saw the accused standing  just outside 
the driver’s side of the vehicle. He inquired into 
whether the accused was injured and asked whether 
he was the driver of the Pathfinder, to which the 
accused replied, “Yes.” He was subsequently placed 
under arrest for impaired driving  - about four 
minutes after police arrival – and handcuffed. He 
stated, “I fucked up,” began to cry and bang  his 
head on the hood of the cruiser, asking  several times 
to be shot. He also said things such as he would 
rather be dead, asked how the babies were, and 
stated that he was just at a Christmas party and had 
a few beers. During  an ensuing  search incident to 
arrest, the accused was heard to say: “drank too 
much J.D.”; “I smoked weed”; “a couple of beers, it’s 
Christmas”. No police questions were being  asked at 
this time. 
 
The accused was escorted to a police cruiser where 
he said “I lost a couple of sisters because of this.” 
Once he was placed in the police car, the accused 
was read his right to counsel and given a caution. 
He acknowledged that he understood and was told 
he could contact his lawyer once they reached the 
police station. He was then let out of the police 
vehicle to be assessed by paramedics and made the 
following  comment, “I made a mistake. I was at a 
Christmas party. He shouldn’t have turned in front of 
me.” Then, when back in the police  cruiser, he said, 
“Shoot me in the back of the head.” He was taken to 
the police station where  the arresting  officer read the 
breath demand because she forgot to do so at the 
scene. The accused spoke to his lawyer and was 
then presented to a breathalyzer technician. The 
breathalyzer technician was informed by the 
arresting  officer of her grounds for arrest. These 
grounds included: 
• the accused had been involved in a traffic 
accident; 
• had an odour of alcohol on his breath; 
• was unsteady on his feet, had slurred speech, and 
he was unable to keep his head up. 
Based on these grounds, the breathalyzer technician 
again read the accused his rights, cautioned him and 
again gave the breath demand. Two breath tests were 
conducted with blood/alcohol readings of 172 mg% 
and 170 mg%. The accused was charged with 
several driving related offences.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The accused argued, among  other things, 
that the  statements he  made to the police 
at the collision scene were inadmissible. 
First, his admission that he was the driver 
was involuntarily since he was under a 
legal obligation pursuant to the s. 199(1) of Ontario’s 
Highway Traffic  Act (HTA)  to report the accident and 
respond to the  officer’s questions. Second, he said he 
was detained at the time he made his statements to 
the other officers. In his view, these statements could 
only  be used to confirm or reject the officer’s 
suspicion that he might be impaired or over the legal 
limit but could not be used as evidence on the 
substantive charges against him. Finally, he 
suggested that the breath demands made at the 
police station were not made “as soon as 
practicable” as required by s. 254(3) of the Criminal 
Code.
BY THE BOOK:
Accident	Report: Ontario’s Highway Traffic Act
s. 199  (1)  Every person in charge of a motor 
vehicle or street car who is directly or 
indirectly involved in an accident shall, if the 
accident results in personal injuries or in 
damage to property apparently exceeding an 
amount prescribed by regulation, report the accident 
forthwith to the nearest police officer and furnish him or her 
with the information concerning the accident as may be 
required by the officer under subsection (3).
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The judge, however, rejected these claims. The test 
for compulsion under a statutory provision like s. 
199(1) of the HTA is whether, at the time that the 
accident was reported by the driver, the driver gave 
the report on the basis of an honest and reasonably 
held belief that he or she was required by law to 
report the accident to the  person to whom the report 
was given. The judge found the accused’s response 
that he was the  driver of the Pathfinder was made 
voluntarily and such evidence was admissible at trial 
to prove that he was the driver, as well as to provide 
reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest and 
demand for breath samples.
 
As for detention, the  judge found that the accused 
was not detained when he dealt with the first officer. 
However, the judge made no specific finding  about 
whether the accused was detained during  his 
subsequent interactions up  until his arrest. In the 
judge’s view, the officer was focusing  on the need to 
deal with injured persons and the initial exchange 
was all preliminary to any focus on possible 
impaired driving. Finally, the  judge found that a 
demand made later at the police station by the 
breathalyzer technician satisfied the requirements of 
s. 254(3)  of the Criminal Code that a demand be 
made “as soon as practicable”. Since the 
breathalyzer technician had made a demand as soon 
as practicable  after he had formed proper grounds, 
the judge ruled that the requirements of s. 254(3) 
were met and the breath samples were taken 
lawfully. The accused was convicted on three counts 
of impaired driving causing bodily harm.
Ontario Court Appeal
The accused submitted that his 
statements were compelled by 
statute or were made while he 
was detained, but had not yet 
exercised his right to counsel under s. 10(b).  In his 
opinion, he was detained when dealing  with the 
officers because he was subject to a psychological 
detention where a  reasonable person would 
conclude, by reason of state conduct, that he had no 
choice but to comply with the directions of the 
police. He also suggested that the statements he  did 
make could only be used for the purpose  of the 
officer establishing  reasonable grounds and not as 
evidence for proving  the substantive offences. 
Finally, he contended that no breath demand was 
made of him at the collision scene. He suggested 
that the trial judge erred in finding  that a demand 
made later at the police station by the breathalyzer 
technician satisfied the requirements of s. 254(3) that 
a demand be made “as soon as practicable”. 
Compulsion
The Court of Appeal rejected the accused’s 
submission that his statement admitting  to being  the 
driver was compelled by statute. “If a declarant gives 
an accident report freely, without believing  or being 
influenced by the fact that he or she is required by 
law to do so, then it cannot be said that the statute is 
the cause of the declarant’s statements,” said Justice 
Brown. “The onus lies on the accused to establish, 
on the  balance of probabilities, that the statement 
was compelled.” Here, there was nothing  in the 
evidence to suggest that the accused confirmed he 
was the driver of the Pathfinder under any subjective 
belief that he was compelled to do so under the 
HTA. The trial judge was correct in his ruling. There 
was no evidence that he had an honest and 
reasonably held belief that he was required by law 
to report the accident to the officer.
Detention
In reviewing  whether there was a  detention the 
Court of Appeal outlined a number of principles 
including:
• A detention under ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter 
refers to a suspension of the individual’s liberty 
interest by a significant physical or psychological 
restraint. Psychological detention can arise: (i) 
where the individual has a legal obligation to 
comply with a restrictive request or demand; or 
(ii) where a reasonable person would conclude 
by reason of the state conduct that he had no 
choice but to comply. [para. 37]
“A detention under ss. 9 and 10 of the 
Charter refers to a suspension of the 
individual’s liberty interest by a significant 
physical or psychological restraint.”
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• Not every interaction between the police and 
members of the public, even for investigative 
purposes, constitutes a detention within the 
meaning of the Charter. Even when an encounter 
clearly results in a detention, such as when a 
person ultimately is arrested and taken into 
police custody, it cannot simply be assumed that 
there was a detention from the beginning  of the 
interaction. [para. 40]
In this case, the accused’s encounter with police 
took place during  the  initial stages of an accident 
investigation by officers who had just arrived on the 
scene and were trying  to sort things out. The trial 
judge’s finding  that the accused was not detained 
was supported by the evidence. “The evidence 
showed the [accused’s] encounter with [the  first 
officer] occurred when the officer was attempting  to 
orient himself to an accident scene at which he had 
just arrived, trying  to sort things out, and was 
engaged in a general inquiry.” 
As for whether the accused was detained when he 
was asked to accompany an officer to a police car 
and produce his driving  documents, it was a fluid 
and dynamic situation, where the events passed 
rapidly. The interaction was more in the nature of 
“preliminary questioning”, than a  detention. Thus, 
the statements made by the accused to the other 
officers before his arrest were made at a time when 
he was not detained.
Statement Use
The trial judge’s admission of the accused’s 
statement at the collision scene on the substantive 
charges was upheld. In this case, the contact 
between the police and the accused arose during  the 
initial stages of an accident investigation. The 
contact did not arise from the stop  of a motorist to 
investigate possible impairment and a requirement 
that the motorist participate in a variety of roadside 
sobriety tests and answer questions about alcohol 
consumption. 
The initial statement admitting  to driving  took place 
while the officer was trying  to sort things out at the 
accident scene and when the  accused was not 
detained. The officer’s questions were not posed as 
part of any compelled direct participation in 
roadside testing. And the accused’s further 
statements were not uttered while he was detained. 
Therefore they could be used as evidence in proving 
the offences. The accused’s statements made after his 
arrest were also admissible. Although the accused 
was detained at the time he made those statements, 
they were spontaneous post-offence utterances. They 
were not made in response to inquiries or questions 
from a police officer. “The evidence discloses that 
the [accused] spoke to [the officer] because he 
wished to speak, not because he was asked to do 
so,” said Justice Brown. 
Breath Demand
Although the trial judge found that the breath 
sample demand by the arresting  officer was not 
made “as soon as practicable”, the  separate demand 
by the breathalyzer technician satisfied the 
requirements of s. 254(3). The demand was “made as 
soon as practicable” by  “a peace officer [who] has 
reasonable grounds to believe that a person is 
committing, or at any time within the preceding 
three  hours has committed, an offence under section 
253 as a result of the consumption of alcohol”:  
[T]he term “peace officer” used in s. 254(3) 
certainly includes both an investigating/arresting 
officer, as well as a breathalyzer technician. On 
the other hand, s. 254(3)(a) requires a person to 
provide a breath sample as soon as practicable 
after a demand is made, and s. 254(3)(b) requires 
the person, “if necessary, to accompany the 
peace officer for that purpose”. That requirement 
“Not every interaction between the police and members of the public, even for 
investigative purposes, constitutes a detention within the meaning of the Charter. Even 
when an encounter clearly results in a detention, such as when a person ultimately is 
arrested and taken into police custody, it cannot simply be assumed that there was a 
detention from the beginning of the interaction.”
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reflects the general practice that the demand for 
a breath sample is made at the scene of a stop or 
accident, and the person then accompanies the 
officer to the police station to provide the breath 
sample. [para. 87]
A s. 254(3)  demand requires only that a peace 
officer form a belief that an impaired driving  offence 
has been committed by the suspect within the past 
three  hours and the demand must follow as soon as 
practicable. In this case, the demand by the 
breathalyzer technician satisfied the requirements of 
s. 254(3)  as long  as he formed reasonable grounds 
within the three-hour time limit and made the 
demand “as soon as practicable” thereafter. Here, he 
had the  necessary reasonable grounds based on the 
briefing  he had with the arresting  officer and made 
his demand immediately following  his formation of 
reasonable grounds. Thus, his demand was made “as 
soon as practicable” and the breath samples were 
lawfully taken. The demand made by the breath 
technician at the police station complied with s. 
254(3).  
Finally, even if the breath samples were not obtained 
as a result of a lawful demand such that there was a 
s. 8  Charter breach, they were nonetheless 
admissible  under s. 24(2). The breach was not 
serious, the collection of the  breath samples 
amounted to no more than a minimal intrusion upon 
the accused’s privacy, bodily  integrity and human 
dignity, and the breath sample results were reliable 
and highly probative evidence that were important 
to the prosecution’s case. The administration of 
justice would not be brought into disrepute by the 
admission of the breathalyzer evidence. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
ROADSIDE	SAMPLE	TAKEN	
FORTHWITH	DESPITE	PUBLIC	
SAFETY	DELAY
R. v. Moussavi, 2016 ONCA 924
The accused’s BMW was involved in a 
collision with another vehicle. The 
roadway was dry and well lit, and 
traffic was light. The driver of the other 
veh ic le su f f e red a s ign i f i can t 
laceration to his head and intracerebral bleeding. A 
passerby called 911. The accused indicated to the 
passerby, and a tow truck operator arriving  on scene, 
that he was the driver of the BMW and that the other 
car hit him. When police arrived, an officer looked 
for the driver of the BMW and saw the accused 
walking  towards the police car. The officer asked the 
accused if he was the BMW driver and he answered 
that he was. The accused said that the other vehicle 
hit him as he was driving  back from downtown 
Toronto. At this point, the officer detected an odour 
of alcohol coming  from the accused’s breath and 
asked whether he had been drinking. The accused 
responded that he had and the officer concluded 
that the accused had been consuming  alcohol 
recently. A second officer became involved and 
“[T]he term “peace officer” used in s. 
254(3) certainly includes both an 
investigating/arresting officer, as well 
as a breathalyzer technician.”
BY THE BOOK:
Breath	Demand: Criminal Code
s. 254 (3) If a peace officer has reasonable 
grounds to believe that a person is committing, 
or at any time within the preceding three hours 
has committed, an offence under section 253 
as a result of the consumption of alcohol, the 
peace officer may, by demand made as soon as practicable, 
require the person
(a) to provide, as soon as practicable,
(i) samples of breath that, in a qualified technician’s 
opinion, will enable a proper analysis to be made to 
determine the concentration, if any, of alcohol in the 
person’s blood…and
(b) if necessary, to accompany the peace officer for that 
purpose. 
Note-able Quote
“The only  thing  greater than a good loser is a 
humble winner.” - Unknown
Volume 16 Issue 6 - November/December 2016
PAGE 25
escorted the accused to a police car to determine 
whether he was impaired.
This second officer noted the  accused to be walking 
in a  nervous fashion. When asked, the accused 
confirmed he was the driver of the BMW and said 
that the other vehicle hit him. An odour of alcohol 
was detected on the accused’s breath and he 
admitted that he had consumed three glasses of 
wine and two shots of Jägermeister. The officer 
suspected the accused had alcohol in his blood and 
a roadside breath sample was demanded. The 
accused failed the screening  test, was arrested and 
had his rights read to him. At the police station he 
spoke to duty counsel and provide two breath 
samples to a qualified technician. It was 
subsequently  determined that the accused was 
travelling  between 171 and 226 km/h just after 
impact and would have been going  faster prior to 
impact. A  Crown toxicologist also put the accused’s 
blood-alcohol concentration at the time of the 
collision between 130mg% and 170mg%. 
Ontario Court of Justice
The accused alleged several Charter 
breaches including  a violation of his s. 7 
right to silence. He argued that he 
provided a self-incriminatory statement 
to the police at the scene of the accident under 
statutory compulsion (s. 199 of Ontario’s Highway 
Traffic Act)  and that his inculpatory  utterance 
establishing  his identity as the driver was 
inadmissible. The judge, however, found the 
accused’s roadside utterances were not compelled. 
Although the accused “had at least a generalized, 
non-specific, understanding  of his duty to report the 
details of an accident under the Highway Traffic 
Act”, the judge found his answers to the initial 
police questions in identifying  himself as a driver did 
not result from his belief that he had a lawful 
obligation to report his involvement in a motor 
vehicle accident. Rather, the evidence demonstrated 
his motivation to speak was self-serving. He wanted 
to offer an exculpatory declaration of his own 
involvement in the collision. “The record confirms 
that the [accused] approached [the officer],” said the 
judge. “I conclude the [accused] volunteered the 
information requested freely and without coercion 
by statute or otherwise.”  
The accused also contended that the breath demand 
for a  roadside sample was not made forthwith under 
s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code because of an 11-
minute delay between the officer’s formulation of his 
suspicion and making  of the breath demand. But the 
judge rejected this submission:
While it can be argued that the demand could 
have been made at an earlier opportunity, I 
conclude the very brief time that passed from the 
point that the [accused] was determined to be 
the driver of the automobile and alcohol was 
detected on the [accused’s] breath to the point of 
the demand is justified by the exigencies 
inherent in this investigation. In reaching this 
conclusion, I note that the investigation took 
place in the early morning  hours, on a major 
highway, at an accident scene that featured two 
badly damaged automobiles and one injured 
driver. The debris field resulting from the 
collision was strewn over three lanes of the 
highway for a distance of approximately 100 
metres. In these circumstances, the police 
concern for public safety serves to justify and 
explain the brief period of delay in the 
administration of the approved screening device.
The accused’s arguments were dismissed and he was 
convicted of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle 
causing bodily harm. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued that the 
trial judge erred in admitting  the 
roadside utterances and in 
finding  that the police were 
permitted to “hold off” providing  rights to counsel or 
delay the making  of the approved screening  device 
demand over “public safety” concerns.
Statutory Compulsion
A person who is compelled to provide a statement to 
police under the statutory reporting  requirements of 
provincial traffic laws have their Charter right to 
silence under s. 7 breached. In this case, however, 
the accused’s free  will to remain silent was not 
overborne because he did not have an honest and 
reasonably held belief that he was required by law 
to report the  accident to the officer even though the 
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injuries sustained and the amount of damage to 
property were circumstances that required the 
drivers of the two vehicles to provide the police 
officers with information concerning  the accident in 
accordance with s. 199(1) of the HTA: 
From his comments at the scene to [the passerby 
and tow operator], before the police arrived, it 
appears that the [accused] was willing to admit 
that he was the driver of the BMW and, 
importantly, that he was anxious to state his 
position about the collision – that is, that the 
other vehicle hit him. Nothing changed when 
the police arrived. His interaction with the 
police was identical to his prior interactions with 
[the passerby and tow operator]. Accordingly, 
the trial judge’s conclusion that the [accused 
“volunteered the information requested freely 
and without coercion by statute or otherwise” is 
entirely supportable on the record.
Whether a roadside statement made by an 
accused to a police officer after an accident is 
statutorily compelled is a question of fact to be 
d e t e r m i n e d b a s e d o n t h e p a r t i c u l a r 
circumstances of each case. There will be 
instances where the accused will in fact be 
speaking  based on a subjective and reasonably 
held belief that he or she must do so. But there 
will be other cases where the accused responds 
freely, entirely unmotivated by any statutory 
duty. In the latter case, the statements are not 
protected by the use immunity provided by s. 7 
of the Charter. [para. 28-29]
“In this case, the [accused] believed that he had to 
report the accident,” said Justice MacPherson for the 
Court of Appeal. “However, he was not influenced 
by this fact. The HTA did not cause him to answer 
the police questions. Thus, when the police asked 
him about whether he was the BMW driver, he gave 
his answer ‘freely’.”
Forthwith
Although there was an 11-minute gap between 
forming  the grounds for the  demand and making  the 
demand, the sample was taken “forthwith” as 
required by s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code. The 
collision was extremely  violent and created a large 
debris field on a major public  highway. The 
circumstances of this accident scene easily 
supported a  public safety rationale for the short 
delay.
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
DUAL	PURPOSE	DID	NOT	
RENDER	RANDOM	STOP	
UNLAWFUL
R. v Ali, 2016 ABCA 261
 
A police officer engaged in proactive 
policing  saw a vehicle driven by the 
accused. Although the officer did not 
know the accused, he recognized his 
passenger (Fearon)  as someone who 
had “been involved in a  variety of criminal 
activity . . . within that area.” The officer also was 
aware, in his experience, that the particular model of 
vehicle being  driven, a Cirrus, could be stolen very 
easily. The officer also knew that stolen vehicles do 
not always show up on the CPIC database. The 
accused’s pattern of driving  was unremarkable and a 
a CPIC search of the vehicle disclosed nothing  of 
concern. The officer then decided to stop the vehicle 
to “see what Mr. Fearon was up to” and to check if 
the vehicle was stolen.
 
“Whether a roadside statement made by an accused to a police officer after an accident 
is statutorily compelled is a question of fact to be determined based on the particular 
circumstances of each case. There will be instances where the accused will in fact be 
speaking based on a subjective and reasonably held belief that he or she must do so. But 
there will be other cases where the accused responds freely, entirely unmotivated by any 
statutory duty.”
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When the accused rolled down his window, the 
officer smelled fresh marijuana and arrested him for 
possessing  a controlled substance. The accused was 
asked to step  out of the vehicle  and another officer 
saw what appeared to be a spitball of cocaine on the 
driver’s seat. The  accused was arrested for that as 
well and he was searched. Marijuana was found in 
his left sock and crack cocaine in his right sock. He 
was taken to the police station and, immediately 
prior to a strip  search, stated, “I will make your job 
easier”. He then handed the officer a large plastic 
bag  containing  smaller bags. During  the strip search, 
a similar bag  was found in the  accused’s anus. The 
accused was charged with possessing  cocaine for 
the purpose of trafficking, possessing  proceeds of 
crime and possessing marihuana.
 
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
 
The judge found the vehicle  stop  to be 
lawful. Although one reason for the stop 
was to check up on the passenger 
Fearon, the  officer also wanted to see if 
the vehicle was stolen. In the judge’s view, the stop 
to check for ownership  documents was a legitimate 
and lawful stop under ss. 166 and 167 of Alberta’s 
Traffic Safety Act and was not a ruse to carry  out a 
criminal investigation without reasonable suspicion.
 
Alberta Court of Appeal
 
The accused argued that the 
officer did not really  stop  him 
for valid traffic safety  reasons. 
Instead, he contended that the 
encounter was a disguised criminal investigation 
unsupported by reasonable suspicion. The Court of 
Appeal, however, found there was evidence showing 
a dual purpose for the stop:
1. to check ownership; and 
2. to check on the passenger (Fearon). 
The trial judge was entitled to accept these 
motivations for the stop.
As well, the trial judge did not err in concluding  that 
an officer can stop a  vehicle  so long  as the stop 
engages an objective of the Traffic Safety Act, 
without the need for any further analysis. “Section 
166(1) of the Act allows a police officer to stop a 
vehicle and check documents ‘for the purposes of 
administering  and enforcing  this Act’, without any 
further requirement of suspicion about illegal 
activity,” said the Court of Appeal. “The most the law 
requires is that the grounds for stopping  a motorist 
are rooted in the statute and are ‘reasonable and can 
be clearly expressed’.” 
Here, stopping  the vehicle to check ownership 
documents was authorized by law. As well, police 
officers can randomly stop  persons for traffic safety 
reasons where it is authorized by statute. There is no 
further requirement there be reasonable suspicion of 
unlawful activity. And when the “stop and search are 
authorized, it is not objectionable that unrelated 
criminal activity is discovered.” The chain of 
investigative activity in this case did not offend the 
Charter:
 
[T]he initial stop to check for ownership 
documents, and the initial interaction between 
the [accused] and [the officer] at the driver’s 
door, were authorized by statute and lawful. At 
that point, the smell of fresh marijuana created 
reasonable grounds to arrest the [accused] for 
possession of a controlled substance, and it was 
the subsequent searches incidental to that arrest 
which uncovered the drugs. [para. 8]
 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
“The most the law requires is that the grounds for stopping a motorist are rooted in the 
statute and are ‘reasonable and can be clearly expressed’.”
Note-able Quote
“The mediocre teacher tells.
The good teacher explains. 
The superior teacher demonstrates.
The great teacher inspires.” 
- William Arthur Ward
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NOT	ALL	UNJUSTIFIED	STRIP	
SEARCHES	ARE	SERIOUS	
MISCONDUCT
Green v. Toronto Police Service, 
2016 ONSC 6433
In the early hours of the morning, a taxi 
driver drove a man to the police  station 
because  the man was intoxicated and 
confused about where he wanted to go. 
At the station two police officers 
approached the man. The man was being  loud, 
belligerent and appeared intoxicated. When he 
began to walk  away he was arrested for being 
intoxicated in a pubic place. He was strip  searched, 
charged with assaulting  a police officer and held in 
custody pending  a  bail hearing. The Crown 
subsequently withdrew the charges against the man 
on the basis that it was not in the public interest to 
proceed. The man then submitted a complaint to the 
Office of the Independent Police Review Director 
(OIPRD) making  11 allegations of misconduct 
against five police officers.
Independent Police Review Director
The OIPRD undertook an investigation 
of the  complaint and concluded there 
was evidence of only one misconduct 
allegation within the meaning  of s. 80 of 
Ontario’s Police Services Act (PSA). The evidence 
disclosed that a  staff sergeant caused a strip  search 
to be conducted when there was neither justification 
nor legal grounds to do so. The Director referred the 
matter to the Chief of police and indicated, in his 
opinion, that the misconduct was not of a serious 
nature because of the following:
• The man had been drinking in excess.
• The man acted in a manner that prompted the 
taxi driver to take him to the police.
• The interaction between the man and the police 
led to the lawful arrest of the applicant for being 
intoxicated in a public place.
• The man was uncooperative and non-compliant 
during his arrest and the booking process.
• The police had residual concerns about the 
man’s identity.
• The subject officer subjectively believed that the 
circumstances met the risk factors required for a 
strip search, and wanted to ensure that the man 
had nothing  in his possession to harm himself or 
others, or to aid in an escape.
• The strip search was done in the manner 
prescribed by police policies, and the man was 
not fully naked at any time and was not asked to 
display himself.
Chief of Police
The Chief agreed with the Director that 
the misconduct was not of a serious 
nature in the circumstances. The Chief 
tried to resolve the matter informally  but 
the man would not consent to an informal 
resolution. The matter was then resolved without a 
hearing.
Ontario Divisional Court
The man sought judicial review 
of the classification of the 
officer’s misconduct by the 
Director and the Chief as being 
not of a serious nature. He submitted, among  other 
things, that the decisions of both the Director and 
the Chief to classify the misconduct as not being  of a 
serious nature were unreasonable.
Classification
Justice Dambolt, for a three member panel of 
Ontario’s Divisional Court, discussed why the 
classification of the conduct as serious or not was 
important. He stated:
Characterizing  possible misconduct as being 
“not of a serious nature” is significant. By virtue 
of s. 68(5), a chief of police is required to hold a 
hearing into a matter referred to him or her 
under s. 68(3) unless the chief, on reviewing the 
Director’s report, is of the opinion that 
misconduct committed by the subject officer 
was not of a serious nature. In that case, 
pursuant to s. 68(6), a chief may resolve the 
matter informally without a hearing  if the police 
officer and the complainant consent to the 
proposed resolution.
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But it must be remembered that characterizing 
misconduct as being  not of a serious nature does 
not preclude the imposition of a serious penalty. 
If consent to an informal resolution is not given, 
a chief may, pursuant to s. 66(10), which applies 
in this circumstance by virtue of s. 68(7), impose 
a penalty on the officer without holding a 
hearing if the officer accepts the penalty. If the 
officer does not accept the penalty, the chief 
must hold a hearing. [paras. 8-9]
And further:
Section 80(1) of the PSA provides that a police 
officer is guilty of misconduct if he or she 
engages in any of 11 categories of proscribed 
activity. The PSA does not characterize any of 
these categories as serious or not serious. No 
category of misconduct is defined as being 
neces sa r i l y s e r ious . I n s t ead the PSA 
contemplates that some instances of misconduct, 
whatever the category, will be of a serious 
nature, and some will not. Instances of 
misconduct that are not of a serious nature may 
be resolved informally or without a hearing if 
certain conditions are met; instances of 
misconduct of a serious nature can only be 
resolved by way of a hearing. The decision about 
seriousness is left initially to the Director, and 
ultimately to the chief of police of the police 
force to which the complaint relates. The PSA 
does not provide any guidance as to when a 
matter is or is not serious. [para. 15]
Here, the man suggested it was unreasonable  for a 
strip search conducted without justification to be 
characterized as anything  but misconduct of a 
serious nature regardless of the circumstances. In 
this light, the man argued that the only single 
reasonable conclusion when a strip  search is carried 
out in the absence of legal justification is that the 
misconduct must be classified as being  of a serious 
nature. But Justice Dambrot disagreed that it would 
be unreasonable for the Director or a  Chief not to 
classify a strip search as being  not of a serious nature 
regardless of the circumstances:
In rejecting the applicant’s position, I do not 
downplay the intrusive nature of strip searches. 
The Supreme Court of Canada has said that strip 
searches, even where conducted lawfully, 
“represent a significant invasion of privacy” and 
a “serious infringement of privacy and personal 
dignity” … . Strip searches are highly intrusive, 
and can be humiliating, embarrassing and 
degrading  for those who are subject to them … . 
No one in this case suggests otherwise. However 
the legislation leaves the determination of the 
seriousness of any particular instance of 
misconduct, including  an unjustified strip 
search, to the Director and the chief of police. 
This is not surprising given that each type of 
misconduct can occur in a myriad of 
circumstances. Even in the case of an unjustified 
s t r ip search , there a re a g rea t many 
considerations that bear on the question of 
seriousness. For example: Did the officer who 
authorized the strip search know what the 
grounds for a lawful strip search are? Did he or 
she have a bona fide belief that the grounds 
were satisfied? Was the strip search conducted in 
conformity with the particular police force’s 
policies? Was the search carried out in privacy? 
Was the search conducted by officers of the 
same sex as the subject of the search? Was the 
search carried out with sensitivity? Was the 
subject of the search ever fully naked? Was the 
subject of the search required to display himself 
or herself? The list goes on.
I see no basis to conclude that no matter what 
the circumstances may be, a strip search may 
not be classified as being misconduct not of a 
serious nature for the purposes of the PSA. In 
saying this, I bear in mind what the significance 
of classifying  misconduct as being not of a 
serious nature actually is for the purposes of the 
PSA. The classification of misconduct as being 
not of a serious nature is not a determination 
that in any sense excuses misconduct. It simply 
provides the chief of police with the option to 
resolve the matter informally or without a 
hearing. And even when this option is available 
to a chief, there are significant constraints on 
informal resolutions and resolutions without a 
hearing. [references omitted, paras. 18-19]
Furthermore, even where the Director and Chief 
have discretion to classify  an unjustified strip  search 
as misconduct not of a serious nature, the decision 
to classify the strip  search in this case as not serious 
was nonetheless reasonable in the circumstances. 
The Director concluded that the  strip search was not 
justified but took into account the following 
considerations:
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• The subject officer subjectively believed that the 
circumstances met the risk factors required for a 
strip search, and wanted to ensure that the man 
had nothing in his possession to harm himself or 
others, or to aid in an escape;
• The strip search was done in the manner 
prescribed by police policies;
• The search was conducted in a private secure area 
of the police station not covered by surveillance 
cameras;
• Only three male police officers were present 
during the search;
• The man was asked to remove his clothing one 
item at a time;
• The officers required the applicant to pull his 
shorts down only briefly, and he was then allowed 
to pull them back up;
• The man was not fully naked at any time and was 
not asked to display himself; and
• No police officer touched the man during  the 
search.
The Divisional Court added:
In addition, it is worth noting that less than 15 
minutes after the strip search, the applicant was 
arrested and charged with assaulting  a police 
officer in connection with the events outside the 
police station and held in custody pending  a bail 
hearing. This arrest would have come as no 
surprise to [staff sergeant]. At that point in time, 
a strip search would have been inevitable, and 
would have been justified on the basis that the 
applicant was going  to be entering the prison 
population. I do not suggest that this 
consideration can provide a post facto 
justification for the strip search. But it may have 
an impact on the seriousness of the misconduct.
Having  regard to all of the circumstances, it 
seems to me to have been entirely reasonable for 
the Director to form the opinion that the 
misconduct was not of a serious nature, with the 
consequence that the possibility of dismissal and 
demotion might be off the table. The decision 
falls within a range of possible, acceptable 
outcomes that are defensible in respect of the 
facts and law. [paras. 31-32]
The man’s application was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
ILLICIT	DRUG	OVERDOSES	IN	BC
The British Columbia  Coroners Service recently 
released statistics for overdose deaths occurring  in its 
province from January 1 to November 30, 2016.
The number of apparent drug  overdose 
deaths from January-October 2016.
The number of deaths involving  males, 
which accounted for 80% of all deaths.
The number of deaths involving 
females.
The Fraser Health Authority had the 
most illicit drug overdose deaths. 
Source: Illicit Drug  Overdose Deaths  in BC - January 1,  2007 
- November 30, 2016.  Ministry of Justice, Office of the Chief 
Coroner. December 8, 2016 Draft.
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